Ellsberg games

Riedel F, Sass L (2014)
Theory and Decision 76(4): 469-509.

Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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Abstract / Bemerkung
In the standard formulation of game theory, agents use mixed strategies in the form of objective and probabilistically precise devices to conceal their actions. We introduce the larger set of probabilistically imprecise devices and study the consequences for the basic results on normal form games. While Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the extended game, there arise new Ellsberg equilibria with distinct outcomes, as we illustrate by negotiation games with three players. We characterize Ellsberg equilibria in two-person conflict and coordination games. These equilibria turn out to be related to experimental deviations from Nash equilibrium play.
Stichworte
Ellsberg games; Knightian uncertainty in games; Strategic ambiguity
Erscheinungsjahr
2014
Zeitschriftentitel
Theory and Decision
Band
76
Ausgabe
4
Seite(n)
469-509
ISSN
0040-5833
eISSN
1573-7187
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2677397

Zitieren

Riedel F, Sass L. Ellsberg games. Theory and Decision. 2014;76(4):469-509.
Riedel, F., & Sass, L. (2014). Ellsberg games. Theory and Decision, 76(4), 469-509. doi:10.1007/s11238-013-9381-4
Riedel, F., and Sass, L. (2014). Ellsberg games. Theory and Decision 76, 469-509.
Riedel, F., & Sass, L., 2014. Ellsberg games. Theory and Decision, 76(4), p 469-509.
F. Riedel and L. Sass, “Ellsberg games”, Theory and Decision, vol. 76, 2014, pp. 469-509.
Riedel, F., Sass, L.: Ellsberg games. Theory and Decision. 76, 469-509 (2014).
Riedel, Frank, and Sass, Linda. “Ellsberg games”. Theory and Decision 76.4 (2014): 469-509.