PUB - Publikationen an der Universität Bielefeld

We study endogenous, credit-financed innovation under uncertainty in dynamic con- texts. In our model, a firm with limited cash reserves decides how much to invest in an R&D project, potentially using external financing. Investing more increases the proba- bility of a sooner innovation, but higher repayment obligations also increase bankruptcy risk if the innovation takes longer. We show that the firm reduces its investment dis- continuously if the financing cost is not favorable enough, in order to avoid the need for external financing. This insight implies that policies reducing financing costs can have discontinuous positive effects on investment, innovation rate and welfare. How- ever, policy measures increasing the effectiveness of R&D might reduce the innovation rate and welfare due to a discontinuous reduction of R&D investment. Furthermore, we find that low financing costs can lead to over-investment. The welfare loss from cash constraints is more severe for radical innovations compared to incremental ones.