A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values

Kuzmics C (2014) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 504.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht| Englisch
 
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Abstract / Bemerkung
In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.
Stichworte
public good provision; asymmetric information; dominant strategy
Erscheinungsjahr
2014
Band
504
Seite(n)
5
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2901478

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Kuzmics C. A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 504. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2014.
Kuzmics, C. (2014). A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 504). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Kuzmics, C. (2014). A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 504, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Kuzmics, C., 2014. A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.504, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
C. Kuzmics, A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 504, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2014.
Kuzmics, C.: A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 504. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2014).
Kuzmics, Christoph. A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2014. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 504.
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2019-09-06T09:18:36Z
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