A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values
Kuzmics C (2014) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 504.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Diskussionspapier
| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
Download
IMW_working_paper_504.pdf
204.17 KB
Autor*in
Abstract / Bemerkung
In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms
in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.
Stichworte
public good provision;
asymmetric information;
dominant strategy
Erscheinungsjahr
2014
Serientitel
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
Band
504
Seite(n)
5
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2901478
Zitieren
Kuzmics C. A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 504. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2014.
Kuzmics, C. (2014). A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 504). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Kuzmics, Christoph. 2014. A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values. Vol. 504. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Kuzmics, C. (2014). A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 504, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Kuzmics, C., 2014. A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.504, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
C. Kuzmics, A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 504, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2014.
Kuzmics, C.: A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 504. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2014).
Kuzmics, Christoph. A full characterization of all deterministic dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2014. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 504.
Alle Dateien verfügbar unter der/den folgenden Lizenz(en):
Copyright Statement:
Dieses Objekt ist durch das Urheberrecht und/oder verwandte Schutzrechte geschützt. [...]
Volltext(e)
Name
IMW_working_paper_504.pdf
204.17 KB
Access Level
Open Access
Zuletzt Hochgeladen
2019-09-06T09:18:36Z
MD5 Prüfsumme
1676c4c075eabbc0c3294f8527368f0a
Google Scholar