Implementing Efficient Market Structure: Optimal Licensing in Natural Oligopoly When Tax Revenue Matters
Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E (2003)
Review of Economic Design 7(4): 443-463.
Zeitschriftenaufsatz
| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Autor*in
Grimm, Veronika;
Riedel, FrankUniBi ;
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Erscheinungsjahr
2003
Zeitschriftentitel
Review of Economic Design
Band
7
Ausgabe
4
Seite(n)
443-463
ISSN
1434-4742
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/1944846
Zitieren
Grimm V, Riedel F, Wolfstetter E. Implementing Efficient Market Structure: Optimal Licensing in Natural Oligopoly When Tax Revenue Matters. Review of Economic Design. 2003;7(4):443-463.
Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2003). Implementing Efficient Market Structure: Optimal Licensing in Natural Oligopoly When Tax Revenue Matters. Review of Economic Design, 7(4), 443-463. https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580300087
Grimm, Veronika, Riedel, Frank, and Wolfstetter, Elmar. 2003. “Implementing Efficient Market Structure: Optimal Licensing in Natural Oligopoly When Tax Revenue Matters”. Review of Economic Design 7 (4): 443-463.
Grimm, V., Riedel, F., and Wolfstetter, E. (2003). Implementing Efficient Market Structure: Optimal Licensing in Natural Oligopoly When Tax Revenue Matters. Review of Economic Design 7, 443-463.
Grimm, V., Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E., 2003. Implementing Efficient Market Structure: Optimal Licensing in Natural Oligopoly When Tax Revenue Matters. Review of Economic Design, 7(4), p 443-463.
V. Grimm, F. Riedel, and E. Wolfstetter, “Implementing Efficient Market Structure: Optimal Licensing in Natural Oligopoly When Tax Revenue Matters”, Review of Economic Design, vol. 7, 2003, pp. 443-463.
Grimm, V., Riedel, F., Wolfstetter, E.: Implementing Efficient Market Structure: Optimal Licensing in Natural Oligopoly When Tax Revenue Matters. Review of Economic Design. 7, 443-463 (2003).
Grimm, Veronika, Riedel, Frank, and Wolfstetter, Elmar. “Implementing Efficient Market Structure: Optimal Licensing in Natural Oligopoly When Tax Revenue Matters”. Review of Economic Design 7.4 (2003): 443-463.