Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals

Jäger G (2008)
Journal of Theoretical Biology 253(1): 131-141.

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Abstract / Bemerkung
The paper investigates the class of signaling games with the following properties: (a) the interests of sender and receiver coincide, (b) different signals incur differential costs, and (c) different events (meanings/types) have different probabilities. Necessary and sufficient conditions are presented for a profile to be evolutionarily stable and neutrally stable, and for a set of profiles to be an evolutionarily stable set. The main finding is that a profile belongs to some evolutionarily stable set if and only if a maximal number of events can be reliably communicated. Furthermore, it is shown that under the replicator dynamics, a set of states with a positive measure is attracted to "sub-optimal" equilibria that do not belong to any asymptotically stable set.
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Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Theoretical Biology
Band
253
Ausgabe
1
Seite(n)
131-141
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Jäger G. Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 2008;253(1):131-141.
Jäger, G. (2008). Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 253(1), 131-141. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.02.039
Jäger, G. (2008). Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals. Journal of Theoretical Biology 253, 131-141.
Jäger, G., 2008. Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 253(1), p 131-141.
G. Jäger, “Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals”, Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 253, 2008, pp. 131-141.
Jäger, G.: Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 253, 131-141 (2008).
Jäger, Gerhard. “Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals”. Journal of Theoretical Biology 253.1 (2008): 131-141.
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3 Zitationen in Europe PMC

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Hummert S, Bohl K, Basanta D, Deutsch A, Werner S, Theissen G, Schroeter A, Schuster S., Mol Biosyst 10(12), 2014
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