PUB

University from A-Z

Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals

Jäger G, Koch-Metzger L, Riedel F (2008)
Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 420. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
748.66 KB
Working Paper | Published | English

Authors
; UniBi ; UniBi
Department
A6 - Evolutionäre Dynamik
Institut für mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung
Abstract

We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of the strict Nash equilibria of this game by representing these categories by Voronoi languages. As the strategy set is infinite static stability concepts for finite games such as ESS are no longer sufficient for Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. We give examples of unstable strict Nash equilibria and stable inefficient Voronoi languages. We derive efficient Voronoi languages with a large number of categories and numerically illustrate stability of some Voronoi languages with large message spaces and non-uniformly distributed types.

Keywords
Communication game ; Dynamic stability ; Cheap talk ; Voronoi tesselation ; Signaling game
Year
2008
ISSN
0931-6558
File Name
420.pdf 748.66 KB
Access Level
Open Access

This data publication is cited in the following publications:
This publication cites the following data publications:

Cite this
Jäger G, Koch-Metzger L, Riedel F. Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 420. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2008.
Jäger, G., Koch-Metzger, L., & Riedel, F. (2008). Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 420) . Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Jäger, G., Koch-Metzger, L., and Riedel, F. (2008). Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 420, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Jäger, G., Koch-Metzger, L., & Riedel, F., 2008. Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.420, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
G. Jäger, L. Koch-Metzger, and F. Riedel, Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 420, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2008.
Jäger, G., Koch-Metzger, L., Riedel, F.: Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 420. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2008).
Jäger, Gerhard, Koch-Metzger, Lars, and Riedel, Frank. Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2008. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 420.
@misc{2316258,
abstract     = {We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of the strict Nash equilibria of this game by representing these categories by Voronoi languages. As the strategy set is infinite static stability concepts for finite games such as ESS are no longer sufficient for Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. We give examples of unstable strict Nash equilibria and stable inefficient Voronoi languages. We derive efficient Voronoi languages with a large number of categories and numerically illustrate stability of some Voronoi languages with large message spaces and non-uniformly distributed types.},
author       = {J{\"a}ger, Gerhard and Koch-Metzger, Lars and Riedel, Frank},
issn         = {0931-6558},
language     = {English},
publisher    = {Universit{\"a}t Bielefeld},
title        = {Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals},
url          = {http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-420.pdf},
volume       = {420},
year         = {2008},
}


TY  - GEN
AB  - We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of the strict Nash equilibria of this game by representing these categories by Voronoi languages. As the strategy set is infinite static stability concepts for finite games such as ESS are no longer sufficient for Lyapunov stability in the replicator dynamics. We give examples of unstable strict Nash equilibria and stable inefficient Voronoi languages. We derive efficient Voronoi languages with a large number of categories and numerically illustrate stability of some Voronoi languages with large message spaces and non-uniformly distributed types.
AU  - Jäger, Gerhard
AU  - Koch-Metzger, Lars
AU  - Riedel, Frank
ID  - 2316258
KW  - Communication game
KW  - Dynamic stability
KW  - Cheap talk
KW  - Voronoi tesselation
KW  - Signaling game
PB  - Universität Bielefeld
PY  - 2008
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Voronoi languages. Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals
U3  - PUB:ID 2316258
UR  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-15602
VL  - 420
ER  -

Export
0 Marked Publication

Open Data PUB