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Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

Haake C-J, Klaus B (2008)
IMW working papers, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
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Working Paper | Published | English
 
Authors
UniBi ;
Department
Institut für mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung
Abstract:
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.
Keywords
Matching with couples ; (Maskin) monotonicity ; Nash implementation ; Stability ; Weakly responsive preferences
Year
2008
ISSN
0931-6558
File Name
Access Level
Open Access
 
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Cite this
Haake C-J, Klaus B. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. IMW working papers. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2008.
Haake, C. - J., & Klaus, B. (2008). Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples (IMW working papers) . Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Haake, C. - J., and Klaus, B. (2008). Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. IMW working papers, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Haake, C.-J., & Klaus, B., 2008. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples, IMW working papers, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus, Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples, IMW working papers, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2008.
Haake, C.-J., Klaus, B.: Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. IMW working papers. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2008).
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Klaus, Bettina. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2008. IMW working papers.
@misc{2315850,
  abstract     = {We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a {\textacutedbl}double stable{\textacutedbl} matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.},
  author       = {Haake, Claus-Jochen and Klaus, Bettina},
  issn         = {0931-6558},
  language     = {English},
  number       = {399},
  publisher    = {Universit{\"a}t Bielefeld},
  title        = {Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples},
  url          = {http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-399.pdf},
  year         = {2008},
}

TY  - GEN
AB  - We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.
AU  - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU  - Klaus, Bettina
ID  - 2315850
IS  - 399
KW  - Matching with couples
KW  - (Maskin) monotonicity
KW  - Nash implementation
KW  - Stability
KW  - Weakly responsive preferences
PB  - Universität Bielefeld
PY  - 2008
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
U3  - PUB:ID 2315850
UR  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13473
ER  -