@misc{2315850,
  abstract     = {We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.},
  author       = {Haake, Claus-Jochen and Klaus, Bettina},
  issn         = {0931-6558},
  language     = {English},
  number       = {399},
  publisher    = {Universit{\"a}t Bielefeld},
  title        = {Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples},
  year         = {2008},
}

TY  - GEN
ID  - 2315850
TI  - Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
AU  - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU  - Klaus, Bettina
PY  - 2008
AB  - We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.
KW  - Matching with couples
KW  - (Maskin) monotonicity
KW  - Nash implementation
KW  - Stability
KW  - Weakly responsive preferences
IS  - 399
PB  - Universität Bielefeld
SN  - 0931-6558
U3  - PUB:ID 2315850
UR  - http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-399.pdf
UR  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13473
ER  -