@misc{2315428,
  abstract     = {We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed.},
  author       = {Haake, Claus-Jochen},
  issn         = {0931-6558},
  language     = {English},
  number       = {366},
  publisher    = {Universit{\"a}t Bielefeld},
  title        = {Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets},
  year         = {2005},
}

TY  - GEN
ID  - 2315428
TI  - Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
AU  - Haake, Claus-Jochen
PY  - 2005
AB  - We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed.
KW  - Support result
KW  - Object division market
KW  - Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
IS  - 366
PB  - Universität Bielefeld
SN  - 0931-6558
U3  - PUB:ID 2315428
UR  - http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-366.pdf
UR  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7012
ER  -