Objectivity, shared values, and trust
Metzen H (2024)
Synthese 203(2): 60.
Zeitschriftenaufsatz
| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
Download

Autor*in
Abstract / Bemerkung
**Abstract**
This paper deals with the nature of trust in science. Understanding what appropriate trust in science is and why it can reasonably break down is important for improving scientists’ trustworthiness. There are two different ways in which philosophers of science think about trust in science: as based on objectivity or as based on shared values. Some authors argue that objectivity actually grounds mere reliance, not genuine trust. They draw on a distinction that philosophers of trust following Annette Baier have made with respect to interpersonal trust, where genuine trust has some normative element to it that is missing in cases of mere reliance. However, I will show that there are plural forms of trust in science: Both objectivity and shared values ground trust in science in a normative sense. I will link the trust in science debate to the literature on interpersonal trust. This is significant in that, beyond references to Baier, there is little connection between both areas of philosophy. In a pluralist reading, different trust accounts help to identify the normative elements involved in different kinds of trust in science.
This paper deals with the nature of trust in science. Understanding what appropriate trust in science is and why it can reasonably break down is important for improving scientists’ trustworthiness. There are two different ways in which philosophers of science think about trust in science: as based on objectivity or as based on shared values. Some authors argue that objectivity actually grounds mere reliance, not genuine trust. They draw on a distinction that philosophers of trust following Annette Baier have made with respect to interpersonal trust, where genuine trust has some normative element to it that is missing in cases of mere reliance. However, I will show that there are plural forms of trust in science: Both objectivity and shared values ground trust in science in a normative sense. I will link the trust in science debate to the literature on interpersonal trust. This is significant in that, beyond references to Baier, there is little connection between both areas of philosophy. In a pluralist reading, different trust accounts help to identify the normative elements involved in different kinds of trust in science.
Stichworte
Trust in science;
Objectivity;
Values in science;
Trust and reliance;
Commitments
Erscheinungsjahr
2024
Zeitschriftentitel
Synthese
Band
203
Ausgabe
2
Art.-Nr.
60
Urheberrecht / Lizenzen
eISSN
1573-0964
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2986833
Zitieren
Metzen H. Objectivity, shared values, and trust. Synthese. 2024;203(2): 60.
Metzen, H. (2024). Objectivity, shared values, and trust. Synthese, 203(2), 60. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04493-3
Metzen, Hanna. 2024. “Objectivity, shared values, and trust”. Synthese 203 (2): 60.
Metzen, H. (2024). Objectivity, shared values, and trust. Synthese 203:60.
Metzen, H., 2024. Objectivity, shared values, and trust. Synthese, 203(2): 60.
H. Metzen, “Objectivity, shared values, and trust”, Synthese, vol. 203, 2024, : 60.
Metzen, H.: Objectivity, shared values, and trust. Synthese. 203, : 60 (2024).
Metzen, Hanna. “Objectivity, shared values, and trust”. Synthese 203.2 (2024): 60.
Alle Dateien verfügbar unter der/den folgenden Lizenz(en):
Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0):
Volltext(e)
Name
s11229-024-04493-3.pdf
373.27 KB
Access Level

Zuletzt Hochgeladen
2024-02-08T06:56:41Z
MD5 Prüfsumme
59da6d95d35c0ad57ecca63aa84d173a
Export
Markieren/ Markierung löschen
Markierte Publikationen
Web of Science
Dieser Datensatz im Web of Science®Suchen in