Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
Förster M (2023)
International Journal of Game Theory 52: 1291–1316.
Zeitschriftenaufsatz
| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
Download
![Open access file OA](https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/images/access_open.png)
Autor*in
Abstract / Bemerkung
In our cheap-talk setting, an expert privately observes multiple binary signals, her soft evidence, about a continuous state of the world and then communicates with a decision-maker. While direct transmission of evidence entails communicating the underlying signals, indirect transmission of evidence entails communicating a summary statistic of her evidence. We first establish that fully informative equilibria exist if the conflict of interest is small. Otherwise, direct transmission of evidence is impossible, as withholding one part of the soft evidence in the communication necessarily induces incentives to manipulate the report on the other part. On the contrary, indirect transmission of evidence remains partially informative for intermediate conflicts of interest. Finally, we introduce the possibility of certification. We show that, if the costs of certification are low, the expert can fully reveal her evidence regardless of the conflict of interest.
Stichworte
Cheap talk;
soft evidence;
imperfect information;
strategic communication;
certification
Erscheinungsjahr
2023
Zeitschriftentitel
International Journal of Game Theory
Band
52
Seite(n)
1291–1316
Urheberrecht / Lizenzen
ISSN
0020-7276
eISSN
1432-1270
Finanzierungs-Informationen
Open-Access-Publikationskosten wurden durch die Universität Bielefeld im Rahmen des DEAL-Vertrags gefördert.
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2977959
Zitieren
Förster M. Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult. International Journal of Game Theory. 2023;52:1291–1316.
Förster, M. (2023). Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult. International Journal of Game Theory, 52, 1291–1316. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00848-1
Förster, Manuel. 2023. “Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult”. International Journal of Game Theory 52: 1291–1316.
Förster, M. (2023). Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult. International Journal of Game Theory 52, 1291–1316.
Förster, M., 2023. Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult. International Journal of Game Theory, 52, p 1291–1316.
M. Förster, “Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult”, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 52, 2023, pp. 1291–1316.
Förster, M.: Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult. International Journal of Game Theory. 52, 1291–1316 (2023).
Förster, Manuel. “Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult”. International Journal of Game Theory 52 (2023): 1291–1316.
Alle Dateien verfügbar unter der/den folgenden Lizenz(en):
Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0):
Volltext(e)
Name
s00182-023-00848-1.pdf
1.91 MB
Access Level
![Open access file OA](https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/images/access_open.png)
Zuletzt Hochgeladen
2024-07-02T13:42:02Z
MD5 Prüfsumme
1b4f34fb79b3a47d20d4c803df7bc7f7
Link(s) zu Volltext(en)
Access Level
![Open access file OA](https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/images/access_open.png)