PUB - Publikationen an der Universität Bielefeld

We examine a scenario of social conflict that is manifest during an interaction between government servants providing a service and citizens who are legally entitled to the service, using evolutionary game-theory in structured populations characterized by an inter-dependent network. Bribe-demands by government servants during such transactions, called harassment bribes, constitute a widespread form of corruption in many countries. We investigate the effect of varying bribe demand made by corrupt officials and the cost of complaining incurred by harassed citizens, on the proliferation of corrupt strategies in the population. We also examine how the connectivity of the various constituent networks affects the spread of corrupt officials in the population. We find that incidents of bribery can be considerably reduced in a network-structured populations compared to mixed populations. Interestingly, we also find that an optimal range for the connectivity of nodes in the citizen’s network (signifying the degree of influence a citizen has in affecting the strategy of other citizens in the network) as well as the interaction network aids in the fixation of honest officers. Our results reveal the important role of network structure and connectivity in asymmetric games.