PUB - Publikationen an der Universität Bielefeld

This thesis studies effort choice and dynamics in games on a fixed social network with strategic complementarities. The three chapters of the thesis discuss different aspects of the social influence present in networks and affecting effort choices of the players. Chapter 1 presents a model of social learning where randomly partitioned groups play minimum effort game each period. The effort choice is based on expectations about the minimum effort which, in turn, is formed based on own experience and communication among social contacts. The results from extensive simulation analysis show that increasing the social influence through communication of beliefs in the social network significantly increases the long-run effort choices in the population. Chapters 2 and 3 study network games with social conflict, spillovers, and personal norms. Chapter 2 discusses the dynamics of efforts with players adapting their personal norms and provides the conditions for reaching consensus in a multi-layer network. Chapter 3 introduces unions in the network game with spillovers and conformity. Players in the unions choose efforts by maximizing their joint utility. A union-intercentrality is defined as a measure of player’s influence on the aggregate effort in the network with unions. Additionally, it is shown that, under certain conditions, joining a union increases the effort of the player herself, as well as, the aggregate effort in the network.