Firms' rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation
Goergen M, Limbach P, Scholz-Daneshgari M (2020)
Journal of Corporate Finance 65: 101770.
Zeitschriftenaufsatz
| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Autor*in
Goergen, Marc;
Limbach, PeterUniBi ;
Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik
Abstract / Bemerkung
Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation Ssingle bondK, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining or separating the roles of CEO and chairman. The stated reasons support both agency theory and organization theory. They are more numerous, comprise more words, and have a more positive tone for firms with duality. Examining the announcement returns to firms' disclosures, we find that investors evaluate the most frequently cited reasons for CEO duality by considering firm's characteristics. Our evidence enhances the understanding of firms' endogenous decision to opt for CEO duality and its value consequences.
Erscheinungsjahr
2020
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Corporate Finance
Band
65
Art.-Nr.
101770
ISSN
09291199
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2958465
Zitieren
Goergen M, Limbach P, Scholz-Daneshgari M. Firms' rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation. Journal of Corporate Finance. 2020;65: 101770.
Goergen, M., Limbach, P., & Scholz-Daneshgari, M. (2020). Firms' rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 65, 101770. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101770
Goergen, Marc, Limbach, Peter, and Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik. 2020. “Firms' rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation”. Journal of Corporate Finance 65: 101770.
Goergen, M., Limbach, P., and Scholz-Daneshgari, M. (2020). Firms' rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation. Journal of Corporate Finance 65:101770.
Goergen, M., Limbach, P., & Scholz-Daneshgari, M., 2020. Firms' rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 65: 101770.
M. Goergen, P. Limbach, and M. Scholz-Daneshgari, “Firms' rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation”, Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 65, 2020, : 101770.
Goergen, M., Limbach, P., Scholz-Daneshgari, M.: Firms' rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation. Journal of Corporate Finance. 65, : 101770 (2020).
Goergen, Marc, Limbach, Peter, and Scholz-Daneshgari, Meik. “Firms' rationales for CEO duality: Evidence from a mandatory disclosure regulation”. Journal of Corporate Finance 65 (2020): 101770.
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