Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers

Betzer A, Lee HS (G), Limbach P, Salas JM (2020)
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55(2): 581-619.

Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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DOI
Autor*in
Betzer, André; Lee, Hye Seung (Grace); Limbach, PeterUniBi ; Salas, Jesus M.
Einrichtung
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften > Corporate Finance and Governance
Abstract / Bemerkung
This study finds a positive, economically meaningful impact of generalist chief executive officers (CEOs) on shareholder value using 164 sudden deaths and 345 non-sudden exogenous turnovers. The higher a departing CEO’s general ability index (GAI), independently and relative to her successor, the lower is the abnormal stock return to turnover announcements. Returns reflect post-turnover changes in operating performance. Further, CEOs’ and successors’ GAIs are significantly positively related, but only for non-sudden turnovers. Consistently, for sudden deaths, we find positive stock returns to appointments of generalist successors. The results provide a market-based explanation for the generalist pay premium.
Erscheinungsjahr
2020
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Band
55
Ausgabe
2
Seite(n)
581-619
ISSN
0022-1090
eISSN
1756-6916
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2958463

Zitieren

Betzer A, Lee HS (G), Limbach P, Salas JM. Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2020;55(2):581-619.
Betzer, A., Lee, H. S. (G. ), Limbach, P., & Salas, J. M. (2020). Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55(2), 581-619. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109018001400
Betzer, André, Lee, Hye Seung (Grace), Limbach, Peter, and Salas, Jesus M. 2020. “Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers”. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55 (2): 581-619.
Betzer, A., Lee, H. S. (G. ), Limbach, P., and Salas, J. M. (2020). Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55, 581-619.
Betzer, A., et al., 2020. Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55(2), p 581-619.
A. Betzer, et al., “Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 55, 2020, pp. 581-619.
Betzer, A., Lee, H.S. (G.), Limbach, P., Salas, J.M.: Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 55, 581-619 (2020).
Betzer, André, Lee, Hye Seung (Grace), Limbach, Peter, and Salas, Jesus M. “Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers”. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55.2 (2020): 581-619.
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