PUB - Publikationen an der Universität Bielefeld

One of the central puzzles in ontology concerns the relation between apparently innocent sentences and their ontologically loaded counterparts. In recent work, Agustin Rayo has developed the insight that such cases can be usefully described with the help of the 'just is' operator: plausibly, for there to be a table just is for there to be some things arranged tablewise; and for the number of dinosaurs to be Zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs. How does the operator relate to another prominent notion that is frequently put to similar use: metaphysical grounding? In this paper I show that despite what has been argued in the literature the 'just is' operator can be spelled out in terms of grounding: roughly, as having the same ultimate grounds. This is good news for Rayo, for it broadens his target audience. It is even better news for the friends of ground. For it exemplifies the immense fruitfulness of the notion of grounding in its ability to incorporate philosophically highly significant subtheories.