Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks

Förster M (2019)
Theoretical Economics 14(1): 253-295.

Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
Abstract / Bemerkung
We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize myopic (best response) equilibria as well as fully informative myopic equilibria. Second, we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a fully informative farsighted (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is truthful along a subnetwork that is a tree. We also consider societies in which both myopic and farsighted agents are present and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications of our results for the design of institutions. Finally, our analysis reveals that myopic equilibria tend to Pareto dominate farsighted equilibria, in particular if a social planner has designed the network optimally.
Stichworte
Cheap talk; information aggregation; learning; social networks; strategic communication
Erscheinungsjahr
2019
Zeitschriftentitel
Theoretical Economics
Band
14
Ausgabe
1
Seite(n)
253-295
ISSN
1933-6837
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2941862

Zitieren

Förster M. Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks. Theoretical Economics. 2019;14(1):253-295.
Förster, M. (2019). Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks. Theoretical Economics, 14(1), 253-295. doi:10.3982/TE3056
Förster, M. (2019). Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks. Theoretical Economics 14, 253-295.
Förster, M., 2019. Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks. Theoretical Economics, 14(1), p 253-295.
M. Förster, “Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks”, Theoretical Economics, vol. 14, 2019, pp. 253-295.
Förster, M.: Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks. Theoretical Economics. 14, 253-295 (2019).
Förster, Manuel. “Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks”. Theoretical Economics 14.1 (2019): 253-295.
Link(s) zu Volltext(en)
Access Level
OA Open Access