Denial and alarmism in collective action problems
Förster M, van der Weele JJ (2018) Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; TI 2018-019/I.
Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
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| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Autor*in
Förster, ManuelUniBi ;
van der Weele, Joel J.
Abstract / Bemerkung
We analyze communication about the social returns to investment in a public good.
We model two agents who have private information about these returns as well as
their own taste for cooperation, or social preferences. Before deciding to contribute
or not, each agent submits an unverifiable report about the returns to the other
agent. We show that even if the public good benefits both agents, there are incentives
to misrepresent information. First, others' willingness to cooperate generates
an incentive for "alarmism", the exaggeration of social returns in order to opportunistically
induce more investment. Second, if people also want to be perceived as
cooperators, a "justification motive" arises for low contributors. As a result, equilibrium
communication features "denial" about the returns, depressing contributions.
We illustrate the model in the context of institutional inertia and the climate change
debate.
Stichworte
cheap talk;
cooperation;
image concerns;
information aggregation;
public goods
Erscheinungsjahr
2018
Serientitel
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper
Band
TI 2018-019/I
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2941638
Zitieren
Förster M, van der Weele JJ. Denial and alarmism in collective action problems. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper. Vol TI 2018-019/I. Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute; 2018.
Förster, M., & van der Weele, J. J. (2018). Denial and alarmism in collective action problems (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI 2018-019/I). Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
Förster, Manuel, and van der Weele, Joel J. 2018. Denial and alarmism in collective action problems. Vol. TI 2018-019/I. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper. Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
Förster, M., and van der Weele, J. J. (2018). Denial and alarmism in collective action problems. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI 2018-019/I, Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
Förster, M., & van der Weele, J.J., 2018. Denial and alarmism in collective action problems, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no.TI 2018-019/I, Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
M. Förster and J.J. van der Weele, Denial and alarmism in collective action problems, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, vol. TI 2018-019/I, Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute, 2018.
Förster, M., van der Weele, J.J.: Denial and alarmism in collective action problems. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI 2018-019/I. Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam ; Rotterdam (2018).
Förster, Manuel, and van der Weele, Joel J. Denial and alarmism in collective action problems. Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute, 2018. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper. TI 2018-019/I.