Denial and alarmism in collective action problems

Förster M, van der Weele JJ (2018) Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper; TI 2018-019/I.
Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute.

Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
Autor*in
Förster, ManuelUniBi ; van der Weele, Joel J.
Abstract / Bemerkung
We analyze communication about the social returns to investment in a public good. We model two agents who have private information about these returns as well as their own taste for cooperation, or social preferences. Before deciding to contribute or not, each agent submits an unverifiable report about the returns to the other agent. We show that even if the public good benefits both agents, there are incentives to misrepresent information. First, others' willingness to cooperate generates an incentive for "alarmism", the exaggeration of social returns in order to opportunistically induce more investment. Second, if people also want to be perceived as cooperators, a "justification motive" arises for low contributors. As a result, equilibrium communication features "denial" about the returns, depressing contributions. We illustrate the model in the context of institutional inertia and the climate change debate.
Stichworte
cheap talk; cooperation; image concerns; information aggregation; public goods
Erscheinungsjahr
2018
Band
TI 2018-019/I
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2941638

Zitieren

Förster M, van der Weele JJ. Denial and alarmism in collective action problems. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper. Vol TI 2018-019/I. Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute; 2018.
Förster, M., & van der Weele, J. J. (2018). Denial and alarmism in collective action problems (Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI 2018-019/I). Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
Förster, M., and van der Weele, J. J. (2018). Denial and alarmism in collective action problems. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI 2018-019/I, Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
Förster, M., & van der Weele, J.J., 2018. Denial and alarmism in collective action problems, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no.TI 2018-019/I, Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute.
M. Förster and J.J. van der Weele, Denial and alarmism in collective action problems, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, vol. TI 2018-019/I, Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute, 2018.
Förster, M., van der Weele, J.J.: Denial and alarmism in collective action problems. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, TI 2018-019/I. Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam ; Rotterdam (2018).
Förster, Manuel, and van der Weele, Joel J. Denial and alarmism in collective action problems. Amsterdam ; Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute, 2018. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper. TI 2018-019/I.
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