[{"license":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","date_updated":"2019-10-23T08:15:14Z","year":"2019","file":[{"creator":"weingarten@uni-bielefeld.de","file_id":"2938205","success":1,"date_created":"2019-10-23T08:11:01Z","file_size":528464,"content_type":"application/pdf","checksum":"df7bf9079f2129edd67e4ecb8989c585","date_updated":"2019-10-23T08:11:01Z","file_name":"IMW_working_paper_626.pdf","relation":"main_file","access_level":"open_access"}],"ddc":["330"],"department":[{"_id":"10053"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We study the effect of strategic and partisan voting on electoral outcomes, and on the\r\nrelative popularity of the victor. Voters are randomly assigned to be partisan or strategic.\r\nWhen all voters are strategic in a plurality election, any equilibrium manipulation of the\r\noutcome elects a popular leader. Voting populations with a large proportion of partisan voters\r\nare more at risk of electing an unpopular leader: in elections with three candidates, if only\r\none-third of the population is partisan, then the winner of the election may be unpopular\r\nwith two-thirds of voters. We derive exact bounds for the proportion of the population\r\nthat benefits from manipulation of the election outcome by strategic voters, for arbitrary\r\nnumbers of voters, candidates, partisans and strategic voters. The analysis also shows that\r\nthe unpopularity of the election winner differs between partisan and strategic voters. When\r\nmost voters are partisan, they may be the vast majority of those who gain from strategic\r\nvoting."}],"intvolume":" 626","publisher":"Center for Mathematical Economics","_id":"2938204","publication_status":"published","place":"Bielefeld","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0931-6558"]},"urn":"urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29382043","oa":1,"page":"32","file_date_updated":"2019-10-23T08:11:01Z","author":[{"full_name":"Barham, Victoria","first_name":"Victoria","last_name":"Barham"},{"last_name":"Demeze-Jouatsa","full_name":"Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman","first_name":"Ghislain-Herman","id":"53496285"},{"full_name":"Pongou, Roland","first_name":"Roland","last_name":"Pongou"}],"date_created":"2019-10-23T08:14:16Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","keyword":["Morality and Politics","Partisan Voting","Winner Unpopularity","Plurality","Impact Heterogeneity","Randomization"],"series_title":"Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers","user_id":"89573","jel":["P16","D72","C7","J15","H41"],"type":"working_paper","volume":626,"citation":{"default":"Barham V, Demeze-Jouatsa G-H, Pongou R (2019) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 626.

Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","bio1":"Barham V, Demeze-Jouatsa G-H, Pongou R (2019)

*Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment*. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 626.

Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","mla":"Barham, Victoria, Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, and Pongou, Roland. *Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment*. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2019. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 626.","ieee":" V. Barham, G.-H. Demeze-Jouatsa, and R. Pongou, *Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment*, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 626, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2019.","lncs":" Barham, V., Demeze-Jouatsa, G.-H., Pongou, R.: Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 626. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2019).","apa_indent":"Barham, V., Demeze-Jouatsa, G. - H., & Pongou, R. (2019). *Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment* (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 626). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

","harvard1":"Barham, V., Demeze-Jouatsa, G.-H., & Pongou, R., 2019. *Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment*, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.626, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","angewandte-chemie":"V. Barham, G. - H. Demeze-Jouatsa, and R. Pongou, *Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment*, Center For Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld, **2019**.","chicago":"Barham, Victoria, Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, and Pongou, Roland. 2019. *Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment*. Vol. 626. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

","frontiers":"Barham, V., Demeze-Jouatsa, G. - H., and Pongou, R. (2019). Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment. *Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers*, 626, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","apa":"Barham, V., Demeze-Jouatsa, G. - H., & Pongou, R. (2019). *Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment* (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 626). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","dgps":"Barham, V., Demeze-Jouatsa, G.-H. & Pongou, R. (2019). *Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment* (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

","wels":"Barham, V.; Demeze-Jouatsa, G. - H.; Pongou, R. (2019): Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","ama":"Barham V, Demeze-Jouatsa G-H, Pongou R. *Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment*. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 626. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2019."},"tmp":{"image":"/images/cc_by.png","short":"CC BY (4.0)","legal_code_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode","name":"Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0)"},"title":"Did Partisan Voters Spoil the Country? A Randomized-thought Experiment"}]