Abstract / Bemerkung
The notion of grounding has gained increasing acceptance among metaphysicians in recent years. In this paper, I argue that this notion can be used to formulate a very attractive version of (property) nominalism, a view that I call 'grounding nominalism'. Simplifying somewhat, this is the view that all properties are grounded in things. I argue that this view is coherent and has a decisive advantage over competing versions of nominalism: it allows us to accept properties as real, while fully accommodating nominalist intuitions. Finally, I defend grounding nominalism against several seemingly troublesome objections.
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Schulte P. Grounding Nominalism. PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY. 2019;100(2):482-505.
Schulte, P. (2019). Grounding Nominalism. PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 100(2), 482-505. doi:10.1111/papq.12259
Schulte, P. (2019). Grounding Nominalism. PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 100, 482-505.
Schulte, P., 2019. Grounding Nominalism. PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, 100(2), p 482-505.
P. Schulte, “Grounding Nominalism”, PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, vol. 100, 2019, pp. 482-505.
Schulte, P.: Grounding Nominalism. PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY. 100, 482-505 (2019).
Schulte, Peter. “Grounding Nominalism”. PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 100.2 (2019): 482-505.