A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion

Pahlke M (2019) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 611.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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Abstract / Bemerkung
Beauchêne, Li, and Li (2019) show that ambiguous persuasion leads to new interim equilibria with higher ex ante value for the Sender compared to the standard Bayesian persuasion. However, in their equilibrium the strategy of the Receiver is in general not ex ante optimal. This note, de fines rectangular beliefs over the full state space in the same setting as Beauchêne et al. (2019) and shows that given rectangular be- liefs the Receiver behaves dynamically consistent. Hence, the interim equilibrium of Beauchêne et al. (2019) is an ante equilibrium, as well.
Stichworte
Bayesian Persuasion; Ambiguity Aversion; Dynamic Consistency
Erscheinungsjahr
2019
Band
611
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2934489

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Pahlke M. A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 611. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2019.
Pahlke, M. (2019). A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 611). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Pahlke, M. (2019). A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 611, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Pahlke, M., 2019. A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.611, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
M. Pahlke, A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 611, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2019.
Pahlke, M.: A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 611. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2019).
Pahlke, Marieke. A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2019. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 611.
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2019-09-06T09:19:06Z
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