A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion
Pahlke M (2019) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 611.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Diskussionspapier
| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
Download
![Open access file OA](https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/images/access_open.png)
Autor*in
Abstract / Bemerkung
Beauchêne, Li, and Li (2019) show that ambiguous persuasion leads to new interim
equilibria with higher ex ante value for the Sender compared to the standard Bayesian
persuasion. However, in their equilibrium the strategy of the Receiver is in general
not ex ante optimal. This note, de fines rectangular beliefs over the full state space
in the same setting as Beauchêne et al. (2019) and shows that given rectangular be-
liefs the Receiver behaves dynamically consistent. Hence, the interim equilibrium of
Beauchêne et al. (2019) is an ante equilibrium, as well.
Stichworte
Bayesian Persuasion;
Ambiguity Aversion;
Dynamic Consistency
Erscheinungsjahr
2019
Serientitel
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
Band
611
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2934489
Zitieren
Pahlke M. A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 611. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2019.
Pahlke, M. (2019). A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 611). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Pahlke, Marieke. 2019. A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion. Vol. 611. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Pahlke, M. (2019). A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 611, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Pahlke, M., 2019. A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.611, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
M. Pahlke, A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 611, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2019.
Pahlke, M.: A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 611. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2019).
Pahlke, Marieke. A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2019. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 611.
Alle Dateien verfügbar unter der/den folgenden Lizenz(en):
Copyright Statement:
Dieses Objekt ist durch das Urheberrecht und/oder verwandte Schutzrechte geschützt. [...]
Volltext(e)
Name
IMW_working_paper_611.pdf
364.18 KB
Access Level
![Open access file OA](https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/images/access_open.png)
Zuletzt Hochgeladen
2019-09-06T09:19:06Z
MD5 Prüfsumme
419245b62fdf82b366e7f97c8b77775c