---
res:
bibo_abstract:
- "The theory of repeated games gives insights to understand and explain how the
behavior of agents who have engaged in a long-run relationship differs from those
of agents who interact only once. The main message of this theory is that repetition
facilitates cooperation. Current models of repeated games assume that at each
point in time, each participant predetermines either her action for the next period,
or the probability distribution her action will be issued from. This assumption
is in contrast with the incomplete and non biding agreements, where participants
agree on a collusive path to follow and are silent about the enforcing mechanism.
\r\n\r\nThis thesis uses a new model of \ffinitely repeated games with objective
ambiguity to show that incomplete contracts are stable. In the considered model,
at each point in time of the repeated game, and given the observed history, each
player has three kind of possible actions for the next period: pure, mixed or
ambiguous. An ambiguous action of a player is a set of lotteries over her set
of pure actions in the stage-game. A player can for instance decide to remain
silent during some periods of the game, which is equivalent to choosing the whole
set of lotteries. I find that remaining silent is an optimal punishment strategy.
This implies for instance that at a Nash equilibrium of the \ffinitely repeated
game, there is no need to specify the enforcing mechanism. Only the target path
matters. Another \ffinding is that adding an infinitesimal level of ambiguity
to the classic model of\r\n\ffinitely repeated games allows to explain the emergence
of cooperation.\r\n\r\nFrom a theoretical point of view, this thesis studies a
model of \ffinitely repeated game that\r\nallows to explain the emergence of cooperation
without relaxing the assumptions on the\r\ninformation structure available to
players (see Kreps et al. (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982)), on the perfectness
of the monitoring technology (see Abreu et al. (1990), Aumann et al. (1995)),
and on players' rationality (see Neyman (1985), Aumann and Sorin (1989)). Another
contribution is the complete folk theorem. It is a full characterization\r\nof
the limit set of the set of payoffs that are approachable by means of pure strategy
subgame perfect Nash equilibria of \ffinite repetitions of an arbitrary normal
form game. In contrast with the classic folk theorem, which provides necessary
and su\x0Ecient conditions on the stage-game which ensure that each feasible and
individually rational payoff vector of the stage-game is approachable by means
of subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the \ffinitely repeated game, the complete
folk theorem applies to any compact normal form game, and provides a full characterization
of the whole set of payoffs achievable by means of equilibrium strategies of the
\ffinitely repeated game.@eng"
bibo_authorlist:
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Ghislain-Herman
foaf_name: Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman
foaf_surname: Demeze-Jouatsa
foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=53496285
bibo_doi: 10.4119/unibi/2933031
dct_date: 2019^xs_gYear
dct_language: eng
dct_publisher: Universität Bielefeld@
dct_title: Essays on finitely repeated games@
...