Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a Strategic Real Options Framework

Huberts N, Dawid H, Kort PM, Huisman K (2019)
European Journal of Operational Research 274(1): 165-185.

Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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Autor/in
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Abstract / Bemerkung
This paper examines a dynamic incumbent-entrant framework with stochastic evolution of the (inverse) demand, in which both the optimal timing of the investments and the capacity choices are explicitly considered. We find that the incumbent invests earlier than the entrant and that entry deterrence is achieved through timing rather than through overinvestment. This is because the incumbent invests earlier and in a smaller amount compared to a scenario without potential entry. If, on the other hand, the size of the investment is exogenously given, the investment order changes and the entrant invests before the incumbent does. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Erscheinungsjahr
2019
Zeitschriftentitel
European Journal of Operational Research
Band
274
Ausgabe
1
Seite(n)
165-185
ISSN
0377-2217
eISSN
1872-6860
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2930913

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Huberts N, Dawid H, Kort PM, Huisman K. Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a Strategic Real Options Framework. European Journal of Operational Research. 2019;274(1):165-185.
Huberts, N., Dawid, H., Kort, P. M., & Huisman, K. (2019). Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a Strategic Real Options Framework. European Journal of Operational Research, 274(1), 165-185. doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2018.08.049
Huberts, N., Dawid, H., Kort, P. M., and Huisman, K. (2019). Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a Strategic Real Options Framework. European Journal of Operational Research 274, 165-185.
Huberts, N., et al., 2019. Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a Strategic Real Options Framework. European Journal of Operational Research, 274(1), p 165-185.
N. Huberts, et al., “Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a Strategic Real Options Framework”, European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 274, 2019, pp. 165-185.
Huberts, N., Dawid, H., Kort, P.M., Huisman, K.: Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a Strategic Real Options Framework. European Journal of Operational Research. 274, 165-185 (2019).
Huberts, Nick, Dawid, Herbert, Kort, Peter M., and Huisman, Kuno. “Entry Deterrence by Timing Rather than Overinvestment in a Strategic Real Options Framework”. European Journal of Operational Research 274.1 (2019): 165-185.