Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors

Pahlke M (2018) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 599.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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Abstract / Bemerkung
This paper generalizes the concept of Sequential Equilibrium to allow for ambiguous incomplete information about types or states. We characterize conditions that ensure existence of Sequential Equilibria under ambiguous incomplete information. Under these conditions players form subjective prior belief sets that satisfy a rectangularity condition which leads to dynamically consistent behavior. Furthermore, we give an example which shows that ambiguity can introduce new Sequential Equilibria.
Stichworte
sequential equilibrium; ambiguity; dynamic consistency; multiple priors; imprecise information
Erscheinungsjahr
2018
Band
599
Seite(n)
54
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2930492

Zitieren

Pahlke M. Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 599. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2018.
Pahlke, M. (2018). Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 599). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Pahlke, M. (2018). Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 599, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Pahlke, M., 2018. Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.599, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
M. Pahlke, Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 599, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2018.
Pahlke, M.: Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 599. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2018).
Pahlke, Marieke. Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2018. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 599.
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2019-09-06T09:19:01Z
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