On a Strategic Model of Pollution Control

Ferrari G, Koch T (2017) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 586.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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Abstract / Bemerkung
This paper proposes a strategic model of pollution control. A firm, representative of the productive sector of a country, aims at maximizing its profits by expanding its production. Assuming that the output of production is proportional to the level of pollutants' emissions, the firm increases the level of pollution. The government of the country aims at minimizing the social costs due to the pollution, and introduces regulatory constraints on the emissions' level, which then effectively cap the output of production. Supposing that the firm and the government face both proportional and fixed costs in order to adopt their policies, we model the previous problem as a stochastic impulse two-person nonzero-sum game. The state variable of the game is the level of the output of production which evolves as a general linearly controlled one-dimensional Itô-diffusion. Following an educated guess, we first construct a pair of candidate equilibrium policies and of corresponding equilibrium values, and we then provide a set of sufficient conditions under which they indeed realize an equilibrium. Our results are complemented by a numerical study when the (uncontrolled) output of production evolves as a geometric Brownian motion, and the firm's operating prot and the government's running cost functions are of power type. An analysis of the dependency of the equilibrium policies and values on the model parameters yields interesting new behaviors that we explain as a consequence of the strategic interaction between the firm and the government.
Stichworte
pollution; stochastic impulse nonzero-sum game; verication theorem; diffusions
Erscheinungsjahr
2017
Band
586
Seite(n)
26
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2930413

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Ferrari G, Koch T. On a Strategic Model of Pollution Control . Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 586. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2017.
Ferrari, G., & Koch, T. (2017). On a Strategic Model of Pollution Control (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 586). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Ferrari, G., and Koch, T. (2017). On a Strategic Model of Pollution Control . Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 586, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Ferrari, G., & Koch, T., 2017. On a Strategic Model of Pollution Control , Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.586, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
G. Ferrari and T. Koch, On a Strategic Model of Pollution Control , Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 586, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2017.
Ferrari, G., Koch, T.: On a Strategic Model of Pollution Control . Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 586. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2017).
Ferrari, Giorgio, and Koch, Torben. On a Strategic Model of Pollution Control . Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2017. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 586.
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2019-09-06T09:19:00Z
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