A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games

Demeze-Jouatsa G-H (2018) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 584.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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Abstract / Bemerkung
I analyze the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. The same method can be used to fully characterize the limit set of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any the finitely repeated game.
Stichworte
Finitely Repeated Games; Pure Strategy; Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium; Limit Perfect Folk Theorem; Discount Factor
Erscheinungsjahr
2018
Serientitel
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
Band
584
Seite(n)
32
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2930382

Zitieren

Demeze-Jouatsa G-H. A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 584. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2018.
Demeze-Jouatsa, G. - H. (2018). A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 584). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman. 2018. A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games. Vol. 584. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Demeze-Jouatsa, G. - H. (2018). A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 584, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Demeze-Jouatsa, G.-H., 2018. A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.584, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
G.-H. Demeze-Jouatsa, A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 584, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2018.
Demeze-Jouatsa, G.-H.: A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 584. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2018).
Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman. A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2018. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 584.
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2019-09-06T09:19:00Z
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