Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks

Gauer F, Hellmann T (2017) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 529, aktual. Version August 2017.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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Abstract / Bemerkung
We study a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011a) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players form costly undirected links, anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent bargaining game. Assuming patient players, we provide a complete characterization of generically pairwise stable networks: specific unions of separated pairs, odd circles, and isolated players constitute this class. We also show that many other structures, such as larger trees or unbalanced bipartite networks, cannot be pairwise stable at all. The analysis implies that the diversity of possible bargaining outcomes is small in (generically) pairwise stable networks.
Stichworte
Bargaining; Network Formation; Noncooperative Games
Erscheinungsjahr
2017
Band
529
Seite(n)
42
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2913287

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Gauer F, Hellmann T. Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 529 aktual. Version August 2017. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2017.
Gauer, F., & Hellmann, T. (2017). Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 529) aktual. Version August 2017. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Gauer, F., and Hellmann, T. (2017). Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 529, aktual. Version August 2017. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Gauer, F., & Hellmann, T., 2017. Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.529, aktual. Version August 2017., Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
F. Gauer and T. Hellmann, Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 529, aktual. Version August 2017., Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2017.
Gauer, F., Hellmann, T.: Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 529, aktual. Version August 2017. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2017).
Gauer, Florian, and Hellmann, Tim. Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. aktual. Version August 2017. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2017. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 529.
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2019-09-06T09:18:50Z
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