Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks
Gauer F, Hellmann T (2017) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 529, aktual. Version August 2017.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Diskussionspapier
| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
Download
IMW_working_paper_529c.pdf
455.54 KB
Autor*in
Abstract / Bemerkung
We study a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011a) bargaining game:
ex-ante homogeneous players form costly undirected links, anticipating expected equilibrium
payoffs from the subsequent bargaining game. Assuming patient players, we provide a complete
characterization of generically pairwise stable networks: specific unions of separated
pairs, odd circles, and isolated players constitute this class. We also show that many other
structures, such as larger trees or unbalanced bipartite networks, cannot be pairwise stable
at all. The analysis implies that the diversity of possible bargaining outcomes is small in
(generically) pairwise stable networks.
Stichworte
Bargaining;
Network Formation;
Noncooperative Games
Erscheinungsjahr
2017
Serientitel
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
Band
529
Seite(n)
42
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2913287
Zitieren
Gauer F, Hellmann T. Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 529 aktual. Version August 2017. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2017.
Gauer, F., & Hellmann, T. (2017). Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 529) aktual. Version August 2017. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Gauer, Florian, and Hellmann, Tim. 2017. Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. aktual. Version August 2017. Vol. 529. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Gauer, F., and Hellmann, T. (2017). Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 529, aktual. Version August 2017. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Gauer, F., & Hellmann, T., 2017. Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.529, aktual. Version August 2017., Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
F. Gauer and T. Hellmann, Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 529, aktual. Version August 2017., Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2017.
Gauer, F., Hellmann, T.: Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 529, aktual. Version August 2017. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2017).
Gauer, Florian, and Hellmann, Tim. Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. aktual. Version August 2017. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2017. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 529.
Alle Dateien verfügbar unter der/den folgenden Lizenz(en):
Copyright Statement:
Dieses Objekt ist durch das Urheberrecht und/oder verwandte Schutzrechte geschützt. [...]
Volltext(e)
Name
IMW_working_paper_529c.pdf
455.54 KB
Access Level
Open Access
Zuletzt Hochgeladen
2019-09-06T09:18:50Z
MD5 Prüfsumme
b7a6d6e2b0af66a38cc84b532d6d4541