[{"urn":"urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29091428","series_title":"Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers","type":"working_paper","date_updated":"2018-07-24T13:00:43Z","_id":"2909142","file_date_updated":"2017-03-14T08:27:22Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"author":[{"full_name":"Schopohl, Simon","first_name":"Simon","id":"52573580","last_name":"Schopohl"}],"jel":["D83","C72","C73"],"department":[{"_id":"10053"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0931-6558"]},"first_author":"Schopohl, Simon","edit_mode":"expert","citation":{"default":"Schopohl S (2017) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 570.

Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","mla":"Schopohl, Simon. *Information transmission in hierarchies*. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2017. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 570.","dgps":"Schopohl, S. (2017). *Information transmission in hierarchies* (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

","bio1":"Schopohl S (2017)

*Information transmission in hierarchies*. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 570.

Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","ama":"Schopohl S. *Information transmission in hierarchies*. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 570. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2017.","apa_indent":"Schopohl, S. (2017). *Information transmission in hierarchies* (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 570). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

","ieee":" S. Schopohl, *Information transmission in hierarchies*, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 570, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2017.","chicago":"Schopohl, Simon. 2017. *Information transmission in hierarchies*. Vol. 570. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

","frontiers":"Schopohl, S. (2017). Information transmission in hierarchies. *Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers*, 570, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","lncs":" Schopohl, S.: Information transmission in hierarchies. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 570. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2017).","apa":"Schopohl, S. (2017). *Information transmission in hierarchies* (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 570). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","angewandte-chemie":"S. Schopohl, *Information transmission in hierarchies*, Center For Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld, **2017**.","aps":" S. Schopohl, Information transmission in hierarchies, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld, 2017).","harvard1":"Schopohl, S., 2017. *Information transmission in hierarchies*, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.570, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","wels":"Schopohl, S. (2017): Information transmission in hierarchies. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics."},"ddc":["330"],"volume":"570","title":"Information transmission in hierarchies","file":[{"relation":"main_file","open_access":"1","file_name":"IMW_working_paper_570.pdf","content_type":"application/x-download","date_created":"2017-03-14T08:21:47Z","creator":"weingarten","file_id":"2909143","success":"1","date_updated":"2017-03-14T08:27:22Z","access_level":"open_access","file_size":"372322"}],"intvolume":" 570","keyword":["communication network","dynamic network game","hierarchical structure","information transmission"],"accept":"1","publication_status":"published","abstract":[{"text":"We analyze a game in which players with unique information are arranged in a hierarchy.\r\nIn the lowest layer each player can decide in each of several rounds either to pass the information\r\nto his successor or to hold. While passing generates an immediate payoff according\r\nto the value of information, the player can also get an additional reward if he is the last\r\nplayer to pass. Facing this problem while discounting over time determines the playerâ€™s\r\nbehavior. Once a successor has collected all information from his workers he starts to play\r\nthe same game with his successor.

\r\nWe state conditions for different Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria and analyse the time it\r\ntakes each hierarchy to centralize the information. This allows us to compare different structures\r\nand state which structure centralizes fastest depending on the information distribution\r\nand other parameters. We show that the time the centralization takes is mostly affected by\r\nthe least informed players.","lang":"eng"}],"locked":"1","oa":1,"year":"2017","status":"public","publisher":"Center for Mathematical Economics","date_created":"2017-03-14T08:25:52Z","place":"Bielefeld"}]