The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent
Diehl C, Kuzmics C (2014) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 489, January 2014.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
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Abstract / Bemerkung
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria
in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences
of the sender are state-independent. We show that only the babbling equilibrium survives
the introduction of any small degree of uncertainty about the sender’s preferences in the
spirit of Harsanyi (1973). Introducing small costs of lying as in Kartik (2009), i.e. a small
preference for sending the actual state as the message, while removing some influential
equilibria, makes others robust to payoff uncertainty. Finally, modelling a small desire
to be truthful endogenously, i.e. by taking into account how the receiver interprets the
message, may make some influential equilibria robust, but may also remove all influential
equilibria.
Stichworte
cheap talk;
communication;
information transmission
Erscheinungsjahr
2014
Serientitel
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
Band
489
Seite(n)
18
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2902683
Zitieren
Diehl C, Kuzmics C. The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 489 January 2014. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2014.
Diehl, C., & Kuzmics, C. (2014). The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 489) January 2014. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Diehl, Christoph, and Kuzmics, Christoph. 2014. The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent. January 2014. Vol. 489. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Diehl, C., and Kuzmics, C. (2014). The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 489, January 2014. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Diehl, C., & Kuzmics, C., 2014. The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.489, January 2014., Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
C. Diehl and C. Kuzmics, The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 489, January 2014., Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2014.
Diehl, C., Kuzmics, C.: The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 489, January 2014. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2014).
Diehl, Christoph, and Kuzmics, Christoph. The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent. January 2014. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2014. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 489.
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