The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent

Diehl C, Kuzmics C (2014) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 489, January 2014.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht| Englisch
 
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Abstract / Bemerkung
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state-independent. We show that only the babbling equilibrium survives the introduction of any small degree of uncertainty about the sender’s preferences in the spirit of Harsanyi (1973). Introducing small costs of lying as in Kartik (2009), i.e. a small preference for sending the actual state as the message, while removing some influential equilibria, makes others robust to payoff uncertainty. Finally, modelling a small desire to be truthful endogenously, i.e. by taking into account how the receiver interprets the message, may make some influential equilibria robust, but may also remove all influential equilibria.
Stichworte
cheap talk; communication; information transmission
Erscheinungsjahr
2014
Band
489
Seite(n)
18
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2902683

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Diehl C, Kuzmics C. The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 489 January 2014. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2014.
Diehl, C., & Kuzmics, C. (2014). The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 489) January 2014. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Diehl, C., and Kuzmics, C. (2014). The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 489, January 2014. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Diehl, C., & Kuzmics, C., 2014. The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.489, January 2014., Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
C. Diehl and C. Kuzmics, The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 489, January 2014., Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2014.
Diehl, C., Kuzmics, C.: The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 489, January 2014. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2014).
Diehl, Christoph, and Kuzmics, Christoph. The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state-independent. January 2014. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2014. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 489.
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2019-09-06T09:18:37Z
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