---
res:
bibo_abstract:
- 'We study the structure of pairwise stable networks from a very general point.
Rather than assuming a particular functional form of utility, we simply assume
that the society is homogeneous, i.e. that agents'' utilities differ only with
respect to their network position while their names do not matter. Existence of
certain stable network structures is then implied by fairly general assumptions
on externalities between links. Depending on the form of link externalities, either
the empty or complete network are always pairwise stable, stable symmetric networks
exist, or stable networks with a connected subgroup exist. If the society becomes
more homogeneous, then it is possible to characterize the set of all pairwise
stable networks: they are nested split graphs (NSG). We illustrate these results
with many examples from the literature, including utility profiles that depend
on centrality measures such as Bonacich centrality. In particular, for low discount
factors every pairwise stable network is an NSG if utility is given by Bonacich
centrality.@eng'
bibo_authorlist:
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Tim
foaf_name: Hellmann, Tim
foaf_surname: Hellmann
foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=170941
- foaf_Person:
foaf_givenName: Jakob
foaf_name: Landwehr, Jakob
foaf_surname: Landwehr
foaf_workInfoHomepage: http://www.librecat.org/personId=35207306
bibo_volume: 517
dct_date: 2014^xs_gYear
dct_isPartOf:
- http://id.crossref.org/issn/0931-6558
dct_language: eng
dct_publisher: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University@
dct_subject:
- Network Formation
- Pairwise Stability
- Existence
- Homogeneity
- Convexity
- Strategic Complements
- Bonacich Centrality
dct_title: Stable Networks in Homogeneous Societies@
...