A note on "The no alternatives argument" by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger

Herzberg F (2014)
European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4(3): 375-384.

Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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DOI
Autor*in
Herzberg, FrederikUniBi
Einrichtung
Institut für mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung
Abstract / Bemerkung
The defence of The No Alternatives Argument in a recent paper by R. Dawid, S. Hartmann and J. Sprenger (forthcoming in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; latest version: February 2013) rests on the assumption (among others) that the number of acceptable alternatives to a scientific hypothesis is independent of the complexity of the scientific problem. This note proves a generalisation of the main theorem by Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger, where this independence assumption is no longer necessary. Some of the other assumptions are also discussed, and the limitations of (this formalisation of) the no-alternatives argument are explored.
Stichworte
Stochastic independence; theory; Bayesian confirmation; No alternatives argument; Argument of no choice
Erscheinungsjahr
2014
Zeitschriftentitel
European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Band
4
Ausgabe
3
Seite(n)
375-384
ISSN
1879-4912
eISSN
1879-4920
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2705586

Zitieren

Herzberg F. A note on "The no alternatives argument" by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 2014;4(3):375-384.
Herzberg, F. (2014). A note on "The no alternatives argument" by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 4(3), 375-384. doi:10.1007/s13194-014-0092-7
Herzberg, Frederik. 2014. “A note on "The no alternatives argument" by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (3): 375-384.
Herzberg, F. (2014). A note on "The no alternatives argument" by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4, 375-384.
Herzberg, F., 2014. A note on "The no alternatives argument" by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 4(3), p 375-384.
F. Herzberg, “A note on "The no alternatives argument" by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, vol. 4, 2014, pp. 375-384.
Herzberg, F.: A note on "The no alternatives argument" by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 4, 375-384 (2014).
Herzberg, Frederik. “A note on "The no alternatives argument" by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4.3 (2014): 375-384.
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