Riedel, F., & Steg, J. - H. (2014). *Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games* (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 524). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

","wels":"Riedel, F.; Steg, J. - H. (2014): Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","aps":" F. Riedel and J. - H. Steg, Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld, 2014).","ama":"Riedel F, Steg J-H. Riedel, Frank, and Steg, Jan-Henrik. 2014. *Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games*. Vol. 524. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

","dgps":"Riedel, F. & Steg, J.-H. (2014). *Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games* (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

","default":"Riedel F, Steg J-H (2014) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 524.Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.","angewandte-chemie":"F. Riedel, and J. - H. Steg,

Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics."},"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0931-6558"]},"intvolume":" 524","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"page":"28","volume":"524","keyword":["timing games","stochastic games","mixed strategies","subgame-perfect equilibrium in continuous time","optimal stopping"],"date_updated":"2018-07-24T13:01:10Z","publisher":"Center for Mathematical Economics","urn":"urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-26987738","title":"Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games","accept":"1","_id":"2698773","jel":["C61","C73","D21","L12"],"file_date_updated":"2016-04-14T14:09:56Z","ddc":["330"],"place":"Bielefeld","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related\r\nnotion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of\r\nsubgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available in general, we argue\r\nthat our model is the appropriate version for timing games. We show that the notion coincides\r\nwith the usual one for discrete-time games. Many timing games in continuous time have only\r\nequilibria in mixed strategies – in particular preemption games, which often occur in the\r\nstrategic real option literature. We provide a sound foundation for some workhorse equilibria\r\nof that literature, which has been lacking as we show. We obtain a general constructive\r\nexistence result for subgame-perfect equilibria in preemption games and illustrate our findings\r\nby several explicit applications."}],"first_author":"Riedel, Frank"}]