Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures

Haake C-J (2009)
International Game Theory Review 11(1): 15-32.

Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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Abstract / Bemerkung
We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.
Erscheinungsjahr
2009
Zeitschriftentitel
International Game Theory Review
Band
11
Ausgabe
1
Seite(n)
15-32
ISSN
0219-1989
eISSN
1793-6675
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2682962

Zitieren

Haake C-J. Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. International Game Theory Review. 2009;11(1):15-32.
Haake, C. - J. (2009). Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. International Game Theory Review, 11(1), 15-32. doi:10.1142/S0219198909002121
Haake, C. - J. (2009). Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. International Game Theory Review 11, 15-32.
Haake, C.-J., 2009. Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. International Game Theory Review, 11(1), p 15-32.
C.-J. Haake, “Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures”, International Game Theory Review, vol. 11, 2009, pp. 15-32.
Haake, C.-J.: Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. International Game Theory Review. 11, 15-32 (2009).
Haake, Claus-Jochen. “Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures”. International Game Theory Review 11.1 (2009): 15-32.

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