A dynamic model of reciprocity with asymmetric equilibrium payoffs
Noeske N (2011) Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics; 446.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
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| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Autor*in
Noeske, Niko
Abstract / Bemerkung
We analyze indirect evolutionary two-player games to identify the dynamic emergence
of (strong) reciprocity in a large number of economic settings. The underlying evolutionary
environment allows for an arbitrary initial population state provided that
every degree of the compact space of reciprocity is adherent to at least one individual
of the corresponding continuum population. The basic results, which essentially
maintain the evolutionary viability of reciprocity, are, in several directions, context
dependent, and minimum valid for the wide class of evolutionary dynamics which
hold for regularity and payoff-monotonicity. The evolutionary solution concept which
is applied to elevate the explanatory power of emerging Nash equilibria is dominance
solvability, in this case, for continuous strategy spaces. An asymmetric aspect comes
into play since the actions of the evolutionary players are not only determined by the
current state of reciprocity but also by their inherent, context-free preferences towards
others which differ among one another devoid of being endogenized in the time span
of the dynamic process at hand.
Stichworte
Reciprocity;
Evolutionary Game Theory;
Dominance Solvability;
Asymmetric Game Setting;
Payoff-monotonic Dynamics
Erscheinungsjahr
2011
Serientitel
Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics
Band
446
Seite(n)
31
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2671761
Zitieren
Noeske N. A dynamic model of reciprocity with asymmetric equilibrium payoffs. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 446. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2011.
Noeske, N. (2011). A dynamic model of reciprocity with asymmetric equilibrium payoffs (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 446). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Noeske, Niko. 2011. A dynamic model of reciprocity with asymmetric equilibrium payoffs. Vol. 446. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Noeske, N. (2011). A dynamic model of reciprocity with asymmetric equilibrium payoffs. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 446, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Noeske, N., 2011. A dynamic model of reciprocity with asymmetric equilibrium payoffs, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.446, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
N. Noeske, A dynamic model of reciprocity with asymmetric equilibrium payoffs, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 446, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2011.
Noeske, N.: A dynamic model of reciprocity with asymmetric equilibrium payoffs. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 446. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2011).
Noeske, Niko. A dynamic model of reciprocity with asymmetric equilibrium payoffs. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2011. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 446.
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