Dawid, HerbertUniBi; Feichtinger, G.
Abstract / Bemerkung
This paper tries to answer the question why the phenomenon of corruption seems to be inherently existent in any society. The dynamic model presented shows how rational agents may generate multiple equilibria of corruption within the same kind of socio-economic system. We assume that the individual disutility caused by the loss of reputation from a corrupt transaction depends on the acceptance of corrupt behavior by the representative individual. Depending on the values of some key parameters like the marginal utility of corrupt behavior and the initial acceptance of corruption a completely corrupt equilibrium where all people completely accept corruption or a completely honest equilibrium where corruption is not accepted at all may be the limit state of the optimal path. Also inner equilibria in-between exist; however, they are always unstable.
dynamic optimization; etace_dynamic_optimization
Journal of Economics
Dawid H, Feichtinger G. On the Persistence of Corruption. Journal of Economics. 1996;64(2):177-193.
Dawid, H., & Feichtinger, G. (1996). On the Persistence of Corruption. Journal of Economics, 64(2), 177-193. doi:10.1007/BF01250114
Dawid, H., and Feichtinger, G. (1996). On the Persistence of Corruption. Journal of Economics 64, 177-193.
Dawid, H., & Feichtinger, G., 1996. On the Persistence of Corruption. Journal of Economics, 64(2), p 177-193.
H. Dawid and G. Feichtinger, “On the Persistence of Corruption”, Journal of Economics, vol. 64, 1996, pp. 177-193.
Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G.: On the Persistence of Corruption. Journal of Economics. 64, 177-193 (1996).
Dawid, Herbert, and Feichtinger, G. “On the Persistence of Corruption”. Journal of Economics 64.2 (1996): 177-193.