Evolutionary stability of games with costly signaling
Jäger G (2007)
In: Proceedings of the Sixteenth Amsterdam Colloquium. Aloni M, Dekker P, Roelofsen F (Eds); Amsterdam: ILLC/Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam: 121-126.
Konferenzbeitrag
| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Jaeger_2007_Evolutionary_stability.pdf
Autor*in
Jäger, Gerhard
Herausgeber*in
Aloni, M.;
Dekker, P.;
Roelofsen, F.
Abstract / Bemerkung
The paper investigates evolutionary stability conditions of the class of signaling games with the following properties: (a) the interests of sender and receiver coincide, (b) different signals incur differential costs, and (c) different events (meanings/types) have different probabilities. The main finding is that a profile belongs to some evolutionarily stable set if and only if a maximal number of events can be reliably communicated. Furthermore, it is shown that under the replicator dynamics, a positive measure of the state space is attracted to "sub-optimal" equilibria that do not belong to any asymptotically stable set.
Erscheinungsjahr
2007
Titel des Konferenzbandes
Proceedings of the Sixteenth Amsterdam Colloquium
Seite(n)
121-126
Konferenz
Sixteenth Amsterdam Colloquium
Konferenzort
Amsterdam
ISBN
978-90-812643-1-0
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2479766
Zitieren
Jäger G. Evolutionary stability of games with costly signaling. In: Aloni M, Dekker P, Roelofsen F, eds. Proceedings of the Sixteenth Amsterdam Colloquium. Amsterdam: ILLC/Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam; 2007: 121-126.
Jäger, G. (2007). Evolutionary stability of games with costly signaling. In M. Aloni, P. Dekker, & F. Roelofsen (Eds.), Proceedings of the Sixteenth Amsterdam Colloquium (pp. 121-126). Amsterdam: ILLC/Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam.
Jäger, Gerhard. 2007. “Evolutionary stability of games with costly signaling”. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth Amsterdam Colloquium, ed. M. Aloni, P. Dekker, and F. Roelofsen, 121-126. Amsterdam: ILLC/Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam.
Jäger, G. (2007). “Evolutionary stability of games with costly signaling” in Proceedings of the Sixteenth Amsterdam Colloquium, Aloni, M., Dekker, P., and Roelofsen, F. eds. (Amsterdam: ILLC/Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam), 121-126.
Jäger, G., 2007. Evolutionary stability of games with costly signaling. In M. Aloni, P. Dekker, & F. Roelofsen, eds. Proceedings of the Sixteenth Amsterdam Colloquium. Amsterdam: ILLC/Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, pp. 121-126.
G. Jäger, “Evolutionary stability of games with costly signaling”, Proceedings of the Sixteenth Amsterdam Colloquium, M. Aloni, P. Dekker, and F. Roelofsen, eds., Amsterdam: ILLC/Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, 2007, pp.121-126.
Jäger, G.: Evolutionary stability of games with costly signaling. In: Aloni, M., Dekker, P., and Roelofsen, F. (eds.) Proceedings of the Sixteenth Amsterdam Colloquium. p. 121-126. ILLC/Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam (2007).
Jäger, Gerhard. “Evolutionary stability of games with costly signaling”. Proceedings of the Sixteenth Amsterdam Colloquium. Ed. M. Aloni, P. Dekker, and F. Roelofsen. Amsterdam: ILLC/Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, 2007. 121-126.
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2019-09-06T09:18:00Z
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