Coalition formation in the Airport Problem

Farrokhi M (2009) Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics; 416.
Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.

Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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Abstract / Bemerkung
We have studied the incentives of forming coalitions in the Airport Problem. It has shown that in this class of games, if coalitions form freely, the Shapley value does not lead to the formation of grand or coalitions with many players. Just a coalition with a few number of players forms to act as the producer and other players would be the consumers of the product. We have found the two member coalition which forms and we have checked its stability.
Stichworte
Coalition formation; Cooperative games; Stable coalition; Shapley value; Airport Problem
Erscheinungsjahr
2009
Band
416
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2316429

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Farrokhi M. Coalition formation in the Airport Problem. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 416. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2009.
Farrokhi, M. (2009). Coalition formation in the Airport Problem (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 416). Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Farrokhi, M. (2009). Coalition formation in the Airport Problem. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 416, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Farrokhi, M., 2009. Coalition formation in the Airport Problem, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.416, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
M. Farrokhi, Coalition formation in the Airport Problem, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 416, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2009.
Farrokhi, M.: Coalition formation in the Airport Problem. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 416. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2009).
Farrokhi, Mahmoud. Coalition formation in the Airport Problem. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2009. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 416.
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