Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Haake C-J, Klaus B (2008) Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics; 399.
Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
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| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Autor*in
Haake, Claus-JochenUniBi;
Klaus, Bettina
Abstract / Bemerkung
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.
Stichworte
Stability;
Nash implementation;
Matching with couples;
(Maskin) monotonicity;
Weakly responsive preferences
Erscheinungsjahr
2008
Serientitel
Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics
Band
399
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2315850
Zitieren
Haake C-J, Klaus B. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 399. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2008.
Haake, C. - J., & Klaus, B. (2008). Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 399). Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Klaus, Bettina. 2008. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. Vol. 399. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Haake, C. - J., and Klaus, B. (2008). Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 399, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Haake, C.-J., & Klaus, B., 2008. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.399, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus, Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 399, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2008.
Haake, C.-J., Klaus, B.: Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 399. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2008).
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Klaus, Bettina. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2008. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 399.
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