A note on apportionment methods
Shellshear E (2007) Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics; 391.
Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Diskussionspapier
| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
Download
Autor*in
Shellshear, Evan
Einrichtung
Abstract / Bemerkung
This paper investigates the suitability of apportionment methods based on the idea of preserving the coalition function of the simple game represented by the populations of the states. The results show that an apportionment method which satisfies desirable properties such as population monotonicity, house monotonicity, etc., does not exist. A classification of simple voting games via winning coalitions is also given.
Stichworte
Apportionment methods;
Simple games;
Winning coalitions
Erscheinungsjahr
2007
Band
391
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2315725
Zitieren
Shellshear E. A note on apportionment methods. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 391. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2007.
Shellshear, E. (2007). A note on apportionment methods (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 391). Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Shellshear, E. (2007). A note on apportionment methods. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 391, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Shellshear, E., 2007. A note on apportionment methods, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.391, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
E. Shellshear, A note on apportionment methods, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 391, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2007.
Shellshear, E.: A note on apportionment methods. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 391. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2007).
Shellshear, Evan. A note on apportionment methods. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2007. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 391.
Google Scholar