A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions

Dimitrov D, Haake C-J (2006) Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics; 386.
Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.

Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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Dimitrov, Dinko; Haake, Claus-JochenUniBi
Abstract / Bemerkung
We consider hedonic coalition formation games that are induced by a simple TU-game and a cooperative solution. For such models, Shenoy's (1979) absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions provides a sufficient condition for core existence. We present three different versions of his condition in order to compare it to the top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) that guarantees nonemptiness of the core in more general models. As it turns out, the top coalition property implies a condition in which Shenoy's paradox is not present for at least one minimal winning coalition. Conversely, if for each non-null player Shenoy's paradox is not present for at least one minimal winnig coalition containing that player, then the induced hedonic game satisfies the top coalition property.
Stichworte
Core; Coalition formation; Paradox of smaller coalitions; Top coalition property; Simple games
Erscheinungsjahr
2006
Band
386
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2315655

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Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 386. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2006.
Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C. - J. (2006). A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 386). Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Dimitrov, D., and Haake, C. - J. (2006). A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 386, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C.-J., 2006. A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.386, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 386, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2006.
Dimitrov, D., Haake, C.-J.: A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 386. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2006).
Dimitrov, Dinko, and Haake, Claus-Jochen. A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2006. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 386.
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2019-09-06T08:57:53Z
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