Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core
Dimitrov D, Haake C-J (2006) Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics; 378.
Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
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| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Autor*in
Dimitrov, Dinko;
Haake, Claus-JochenUniBi
Abstract / Bemerkung
We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty.
Stichworte
Paradox of smaller coalitions;
Coalition formation;
Winning coalitions;
Semistrict core;
Simple games
Erscheinungsjahr
2006
Serientitel
Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics
Band
378
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2315639
Zitieren
Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 378. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2006.
Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C. - J. (2006). Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 378). Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Dimitrov, Dinko, and Haake, Claus-Jochen. 2006. Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core. Vol. 378. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Dimitrov, D., and Haake, C. - J. (2006). Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 378, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C.-J., 2006. Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.378, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 378, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2006.
Dimitrov, D., Haake, C.-J.: Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 378. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2006).
Dimitrov, Dinko, and Haake, Claus-Jochen. Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2006. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 378.
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