Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game

Sun N, Trockel W, Yang Z (2004) Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics; 358.
Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.

Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
Download
OA
Autor*in
Sun, Ning; Trockel, WalterUniBi ; Yang, Zaifu
Abstract / Bemerkung
In this paper we study competitve outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory. For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and only if the completion of the game is balanced. The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the coalitions of the game emerge endogenously from the full core. Second, it is shown that the full core of a completion-balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy and that the coalition structures of the game are endogenously determined by the equilibrium outcomes of the economy. As a consequence, the core of a balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy.
Stichworte
Endogenous coalition formation; Cooperative games; Full core; Core; Equilibrium
Erscheinungsjahr
2004
Band
358
ISSN
0931-6558
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2315412

Zitieren

Sun N, Trockel W, Yang Z. Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 358. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2004.
Sun, N., Trockel, W., & Yang, Z. (2004). Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 358). Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Sun, N., Trockel, W., and Yang, Z. (2004). Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 358, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Sun, N., Trockel, W., & Yang, Z., 2004. Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.358, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
N. Sun, W. Trockel, and Z. Yang, Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 358, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2004.
Sun, N., Trockel, W., Yang, Z.: Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 358. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2004).
Sun, Ning, Trockel, Walter, and Yang, Zaifu. Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2004. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 358.
Alle Dateien verfügbar unter der/den folgenden Lizenz(en):
Copyright Statement:
This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. [...]
Volltext(e)
Access Level
OA Open Access
Zuletzt Hochgeladen
2019-09-06T08:57:53Z
MD5 Prüfsumme
377d274e5f5b761505b7d4d62c904dc6

Export

Markieren/ Markierung löschen
Markierte Publikationen

Open Data PUB

Suchen in

Google Scholar