Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis

Dawid H, Feichtinger G, Novak A (2002)
European Journal of Political Economy 18(3): 499-516.

Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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Autor*in
Dawid, HerbertUniBi ; Feichtinger, G.; Novak, A.
Abstract / Bemerkung
In this paper we use a differential game analysis to study the dynamic strategic interaction between a criminal gang extorting money from local shop-owners and the local police force. In particular, we are interested in characterizing which factors are important in determining whether the capital stock of local shop-owners keeps growing in spite of extortion or the criminal activity leads to a phase of stagnation of the local economy. A Markov perfect equilibrium of the game is characterized in order to address this question and several policy implications are derived to facilitate growth in regions affected by extortion.
Stichworte
dynamic optimization; etace_dynamic_optimization
Erscheinungsjahr
2002
Zeitschriftentitel
European Journal of Political Economy
Band
18
Ausgabe
3
Seite(n)
499-516
ISSN
0176-2680
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/1884971

Zitieren

Dawid H, Feichtinger G, Novak A. Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy. 2002;18(3):499-516.
Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G., & Novak, A. (2002). Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, 18(3), 499-516.
Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G., and Novak, A. (2002). Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy 18, 499-516.
Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G., & Novak, A., 2002. Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, 18(3), p 499-516.
H. Dawid, G. Feichtinger, and A. Novak, “Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis”, European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 18, 2002, pp. 499-516.
Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G., Novak, A.: Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy. 18, 499-516 (2002).
Dawid, Herbert, Feichtinger, G., and Novak, A. “Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis”. European Journal of Political Economy 18.3 (2002): 499-516.
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2019-09-06T08:49:11Z
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