Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis

Dawid H, Feichtinger G, Novak A (2002)
European Journal of Political Economy 18(3): 499-516.

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Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Abstract / Bemerkung
In this paper we use a differential game analysis to study the dynamic strategic interaction between a criminal gang extorting money from local shop-owners and the local police force. In particular, we are interested in characterizing which factors are important in determining whether the capital stock of local shop-owners keeps growing in spite of extortion or the criminal activity leads to a phase of stagnation of the local economy. A Markov perfect equilibrium of the game is characterized in order to address this question and several policy implications are derived to facilitate growth in regions affected by extortion.
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Zeitschriftentitel
European Journal of Political Economy
Band
18
Zeitschriftennummer
3
Seite
499-516
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Dawid H, Feichtinger G, Novak A. Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy. 2002;18(3):499-516.
Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G., & Novak, A. (2002). Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, 18(3), 499-516.
Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G., and Novak, A. (2002). Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy 18, 499-516.
Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G., & Novak, A., 2002. Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, 18(3), p 499-516.
H. Dawid, G. Feichtinger, and A. Novak, “Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis”, European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 18, 2002, pp. 499-516.
Dawid, H., Feichtinger, G., Novak, A.: Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis. European Journal of Political Economy. 18, 499-516 (2002).
Dawid, Herbert, Feichtinger, G., and Novak, A. “Extortion as an Obstacle to Economic Growth: A Dynamic Game Analysis”. European Journal of Political Economy 18.3 (2002): 499-516.
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2016-11-16T12:00:41Z

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