[{"id":"1635240","date_created":"2010-04-29T13:07:34Z","author":[{"autoren_ansetzung":["Haake, Claus-Jochen","Haake","Claus-Jochen Haake","Haake, C","Haake, C.","C Haake","C. Haake"],"last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"63284"}],"date_submitted":"2011-01-10T10:04:50Z","isi":"1","year":"2009","_id":"1635240","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004","citation":{"mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen. “Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets”. *MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES* 57.2 (2009): 177-187.","ieee":" C.-J. Haake, “Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets”, *MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES*, vol. 57, 2009, pp. 177-187.","frontiers":"Haake, C. - J. (2009). Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. *MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES* 57, 177-187.","angewandte-chemie":"C. - J. Haake, “Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets”, *MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES*, **2009**, *57*, 177-187.","aps":" C. - J. Haake, Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets, MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES **57**, 177 (2009).","ama":"Haake C-J. Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. *MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES*. 2009;57(2):177-187.","harvard1":"Haake, C.-J., 2009. Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. *MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES*, 57(2), p 177-187.","apa":"Haake, C. - J. (2009). Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. *MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES*, *57*(2), 177-187. doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen. 2009. “Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets”. *MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES* 57 (2): 177-187.

","dgps":"Haake, C.-J. (2009). Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. *MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES*, *57*(2), 177-187. Elsevier BV. doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004.

","apa_indent":"Haake, C. - J. (2009). Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. *MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES*, *57*(2), 177-187. doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004

","bio1":"Haake C-J (2009)

Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets.

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES 57(2): 177-187.","lncs":" Haake, C.-J.: Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES. 57, 177-187 (2009).","default":"Haake C-J (2009)

*MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES* 57(2): 177-187.","wels":"Haake, C. - J. (2009): Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets *MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES*,57:(2): 177-187."},"quality_controlled":"1","title":"Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets","intvolume":" 57","publication":"MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0165-4896"]},"type":"journal_article","first_author":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","keyword":["Object division market","Support result","Kalai-Smorodinsky solution"],"date_updated":"2018-07-24T12:57:42Z","publisher":"Elsevier BV","issue":"2","article_type":"original","publication_status":"published","volume":"57","page":"177-187","status":"public","accept":"1","external_id":{"isi":["000264000300004"]},"abstract":[{"text":"We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Strategic interaction determines an allocation of objects, so that evaluation with individual utilities constitute the pay-offs in the derived games. These allocations of objects are obtained through individual demand in a specific market for objects. For the first support result, games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium and equilibrium payoffs equal the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution of the underlying bargaining problem. The second result uses subgame perfect equilibria of a game in extensive form. Again, payoffs in any subgame perfect equilibrium coincide with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.","lang":"eng"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"department":[{"_id":"10053"}]}]