A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution
Trockel W (2002)
Social Choice and Welfare 19(3): 581-586.
Zeitschriftenaufsatz
| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Abstract / Bemerkung
This paper follows van Damme (1986) in presenting a meta bargaining approach that justifies the Nash bargaining solution. But in contrast to van Damme's procedure our meta bargaining game is universal in the sense that all bargaining solutions are allowed as strategic choices in the meta bargaining game. Also our result holds true for any number n of players.
Erscheinungsjahr
2002
Zeitschriftentitel
Social Choice and Welfare
Band
19
Ausgabe
3
Seite(n)
581-586
ISSN
0176-1714
eISSN
1432-217X
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/1613926
Zitieren
Trockel W. A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare. 2002;19(3):581-586.
Trockel, W. (2002). A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare, 19(3), 581-586. https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550100133
Trockel, Walter. 2002. “A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution”. Social Choice and Welfare 19 (3): 581-586.
Trockel, W. (2002). A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare 19, 581-586.
Trockel, W., 2002. A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare, 19(3), p 581-586.
W. Trockel, “A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution”, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19, 2002, pp. 581-586.
Trockel, W.: A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare. 19, 581-586 (2002).
Trockel, Walter. “A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution”. Social Choice and Welfare 19.3 (2002): 581-586.
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