Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information

Eckwert B, Zilcha I (2003)
ECONOMIC THEORY 21(1): 43-58.

Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
 
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Autor*in
Eckwert, BernhardUniBi; Zilcha, Itzhak
Abstract / Bemerkung
The paper constructs a theoretical framework in which the value of information in general equilibrium is determined by the interaction of two opposing mechanisms: first, more information about future random events leads to better individual decisions and, therefore, higher welfare. This is the 'Blackwell effect' where information has positive value. Second, more information in advance of trading limits the risk sharing opportunities in the economy and, therefore, reduces welfare. This is the 'Hirshleifer effect' where information has negative value. We demonstrate that in an economy with production information has positive value if the information refers to non-tradable risks; hence, such information does not destroy the Blackwell theorem. Information which refers to tradable risks may invalidate the Blackwell theorem if the consumers are highly risk averse. The critical level of relative risk aversion beyond which the value of information becomes negative is less than 0.5.
Stichworte
risk sharing markets; value of information; general equilibrium
Erscheinungsjahr
2003
Zeitschriftentitel
ECONOMIC THEORY
Band
21
Ausgabe
1
Seite(n)
43-58
ISSN
0938-2259
eISSN
1432-0479
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/1612872

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Eckwert B, Zilcha I. Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information. ECONOMIC THEORY. 2003;21(1):43-58.
Eckwert, B., & Zilcha, I. (2003). Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information. ECONOMIC THEORY, 21(1), 43-58. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0275-x
Eckwert, Bernhard, and Zilcha, Itzhak. 2003. “Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information”. ECONOMIC THEORY 21 (1): 43-58.
Eckwert, B., and Zilcha, I. (2003). Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information. ECONOMIC THEORY 21, 43-58.
Eckwert, B., & Zilcha, I., 2003. Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information. ECONOMIC THEORY, 21(1), p 43-58.
B. Eckwert and I. Zilcha, “Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information”, ECONOMIC THEORY, vol. 21, 2003, pp. 43-58.
Eckwert, B., Zilcha, I.: Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information. ECONOMIC THEORY. 21, 43-58 (2003).
Eckwert, Bernhard, and Zilcha, Itzhak. “Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information”. ECONOMIC THEORY 21.1 (2003): 43-58.
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