Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms
Dawid H, MacLeod WB (2008)
Games and Economic Behavior 62(1): 26-52.
Zeitschriftenaufsatz
| Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Autor*in
Dawid, HerbertUniBi ;
MacLeod, W. Bentley
Einrichtung
Abstract / Bemerkung
The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolution of bargaining norms in a simple production problem with two-sided relationship specific investments and competition. The puzzle we wish to address is why efficient bargaining norms do not evolve even though there exist efficient sequential equilibria. Conditions under which stochastically stable bargaining conventions exist are characterized, and it is shown that there is a hierarchy of norms, with a stochastically stable division rule that is independent of the long run investment strategy. Due to this independence, efficient sequential equilibria are not in general stochastically stable. This result may help us understand why institutions, such as firms, may be needed to ensure efficient relationship specific investments. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Stichworte
stochastic stability;
investment;
evolution of norms;
fair division;
dynamic optimization;
etace_dynamic_optimization
Erscheinungsjahr
2008
Zeitschriftentitel
Games and Economic Behavior
Band
62
Ausgabe
1
Seite(n)
26-52
ISSN
0899-8256
Page URI
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/1592670
Zitieren
Dawid H, MacLeod WB. Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms. Games and Economic Behavior. 2008;62(1):26-52.
Dawid, H., & MacLeod, W. B. (2008). Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1), 26-52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.004
Dawid, Herbert, and MacLeod, W. Bentley. 2008. “Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms”. Games and Economic Behavior 62 (1): 26-52.
Dawid, H., and MacLeod, W. B. (2008). Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms. Games and Economic Behavior 62, 26-52.
Dawid, H., & MacLeod, W.B., 2008. Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1), p 26-52.
H. Dawid and W.B. MacLeod, “Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms”, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 62, 2008, pp. 26-52.
Dawid, H., MacLeod, W.B.: Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms. Games and Economic Behavior. 62, 26-52 (2008).
Dawid, Herbert, and MacLeod, W. Bentley. “Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms”. Games and Economic Behavior 62.1 (2008): 26-52.
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