Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks

Gauer F, Hellmann T (2017)
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 106: 51-74.

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Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
Abstract / Bemerkung
We study a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011a) bargaining game: ex ante homogeneous players form costly undirected links, anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent bargaining game. Assuming patient players, we provide a complete characterization of generically pairwise stable networks: specific unions of separated pairs, odd circles, and isolated players constitute this class. We also show that many other structures, such as larger trees or unbalanced bipartite networks, cannot be pairwise stable at all. The analysis implies that the diversity of possible bargaining outcomes is small in (generically) pairwise stable networks. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Erscheinungsjahr
Zeitschriftentitel
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Band
106
Seite
51-74
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Gauer F, Hellmann T. Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. 2017;106:51-74.
Gauer, F., & Hellmann, T. (2017). Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 106, 51-74. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.011
Gauer, F., and Hellmann, T. (2017). Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 106, 51-74.
Gauer, F., & Hellmann, T., 2017. Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 106, p 51-74.
F. Gauer and T. Hellmann, “Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks”, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, vol. 106, 2017, pp. 51-74.
Gauer, F., Hellmann, T.: Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. 106, 51-74 (2017).
Gauer, Florian, and Hellmann, Tim. “Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks”. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 106 (2017): 51-74.