Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system

Brams SJ, Kaplan TR (2002) Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics; 340.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

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Brams SJ, Kaplan TR. Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 340. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2002.
Brams, S. J., & Kaplan, T. R. (2002). Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 340). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Brams, S. J., and Kaplan, T. R. (2002). Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 340, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Brams, S.J., & Kaplan, T.R., 2002. Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.340, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
S.J. Brams and T.R. Kaplan, Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 340, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2002.
Brams, S.J., Kaplan, T.R.: Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 340. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2002).
Brams, Steven J., and Kaplan, Todd R. Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2002. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 340.
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