Paradigm Terms: The Necessity of Kind Term Identifications Generalized

Nimtz C (2017)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(1): 124-140.

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Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Elektronische Veröffentlichung vor dem Druck | Englisch
Abstract / Bemerkung
Standard Kripke-Putnam semantics is widely taken to entail that theoretical identifications like Brontosauruses are Apatosauruses' or Gold is Au-79' are necessary, if true. I offer a new diagnosis as to why this modal consequence ensues. Central to my diagnosis is the concept of a paradigm term. I argue that modal and epistemic peculiarities that are commonly considered as distinctive of natural kind expressions are in fact traits that are shared by paradigm terms in general. Philosophical semantics should broaden its focus from natural kind expressions to paradigm terms.
Erscheinungsjahr
Zeitschriftentitel
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Band
95
Zeitschriftennummer
1
Seite
124-140
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eISSN
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Nimtz C. Paradigm Terms: The Necessity of Kind Term Identifications Generalized. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 2017;95(1):124-140.
Nimtz, C. (2017). Paradigm Terms: The Necessity of Kind Term Identifications Generalized. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(1), 124-140. doi:10.1080/00048402.2016.1155226
Nimtz, C. (2017). Paradigm Terms: The Necessity of Kind Term Identifications Generalized. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95, 124-140.
Nimtz, C., 2017. Paradigm Terms: The Necessity of Kind Term Identifications Generalized. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95(1), p 124-140.
C. Nimtz, “Paradigm Terms: The Necessity of Kind Term Identifications Generalized”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 95, 2017, pp. 124-140.
Nimtz, C.: Paradigm Terms: The Necessity of Kind Term Identifications Generalized. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 95, 124-140 (2017).
Nimtz, Christian. “Paradigm Terms: The Necessity of Kind Term Identifications Generalized”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95.1 (2017): 124-140.