Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks

Gauer F (2016) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 529, Version August 2016.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

Download
OA 393.70 KB
Working Paper | Published | English
Abstract
We analyze a model of strategic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game: ex-ante homogeneous players form costly undirected links, anticipating expected equilibrium payoffs from the subsequent network bargaining. Assuming patient players, we provide a complete characterization of generically pairwise stable networks: specific unions of separated pairs, odd circles, and isolated players constitute this class. We also show that many other structures, such as larger trees or unbalanced bipartite networks, cannot be pairwise stable at all. As an important implication, this reveals that the diversity of possible bargaining outcomes is substantially narrowed down, provided that the underlying network is (generically) pairwise stable.
Publishing Year
ISSN
PUB-ID

Cite this

Gauer F. Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 529 Version August 2016. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2016.
Gauer, F. (2016). Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 529) Version August 2016. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Gauer, F. (2016). Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 529, Version August 2016. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Gauer, F., 2016. Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.529, Version August 2016., Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
F. Gauer, Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 529, Version August 2016., Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2016.
Gauer, F.: Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 529, Version August 2016. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2016).
Gauer, Florian. Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks. Version August 2016. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2016. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 529.
Main File(s)
Access Level
OA Open Access
Last Uploaded
2016-10-05T11:48:48Z

This data publication is cited in the following publications:
This publication cites the following data publications:

Export

0 Marked Publications

Open Data PUB

Search this title in

Google Scholar